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Rethinking the “Law and Finance” Paradigm 
Katharina Pistor 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The label “Law and Finance” stands for a body of literature that 
has dominated policy-making and academic debates for the past 
decade. The literature has its origin in a series of papers co-authored 
by Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and 
a cohort of other researchers, including Robert Vishny, Simeon 
Djankov et al. (hereinafter referred to as LLS et al.).1 More than ten 
years after “Law and Finance” was first published, it seems 
appropriate to step back and consider the contribution this literature 
has made, but also to point out where it has gone astray and deviated 
attention from what the critical issues are for Law and Finance and, 
more broadly, for law and development. The lead authors of this 
literature have given their own assessment of theirs as well as of 
related work in a paper that has recently been published by the 
Journal of Economic Literature, which I will refer to throughout this 
essay.2 The second part of this essay will be devoted to a critique of 
the Law and Finance paradigm. The third part will sketch out 
alternative strategies for analyzing the role of law and legal 
 
   Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank 
participants at the symposium on “Evaluating Legal Origins Theory” for insightful comments 
and suggestions. Thanks also to my co-author Curtis Milhaupt for the book Law and 
Capitalism on which the analysis in Part II of this paper rests. All remaining errors or 
misrepresentations are mine. 
 1. The original paper is Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta, et al., Law and 
Finance]. The paper Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert 
W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, LII J. FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La 
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance] was published earlier, but builds on Law 
and Finance. The difference in publication dates is most likely related to the pace of 
publication at different journals. Several other papers test specific applications of the paradigm 
established in this work. They will be referred to later in this paper if and when relevant. 
Conceptually more important is Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595 
(2003), as they seek to explain the origins of different types of legal systems. 
 2. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 285 (2008). 
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institutions and the relation between legal and economic change in 
comparative perspective.  
II. CRITIQUE OF THE LAW AND FINANCE PARADIGM 
Before developing the critique it seems useful to summarize the 
key arguments of the Law and Finance literature. First, countries can 
be divided into different legal traditions, or legal origins. The most 
important divide is between the common law system and the civil 
law system.3 Second, legal indicators that measure the protection of 
owners, investors, and those that are generally “business friendly”4 
differ among countries with different legal origins. In general, 
common law countries are more business friendly than civil law 
countries. Third, common law countries are also associated with 
better-developed financial markets. Fourth, law is a determinant 
(cause) of the observed economic outcomes.  
My critique of this paradigm can be summarized in three points: 
(1) the extrapolation fallacy; (2) the transmission problem; and (3) 
the exogeneity paradox. 
 
A. The Extrapolation Fallacy 
 
The practice of developing theories about complex systems, such 
as markets, society, or law, from simple micro-level models 
(contractual relations) gives rise to an extrapolation fallacy. This 
strategy assumes that a market is equivalent to the sum of all 
contracts or can be fully explained by multiplying stakeholder 
relations at a single firm by the number of firms in the market. The 
extrapolation fallacy permeates economic theories and thus is not a 
critique specifically of the work of LLS et al. Indeed, economics has 
so far failed to offer a comprehensive theory of the market, and 
instead focuses on contracts, property rights, and firms. As is well 
 
 3. This is obviously not an original finding but builds on well-established traditions in 
comparative law. The literature is voluminous. For several of the most well-known accounts, 
see RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 
(1985); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1998); 
John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the 
Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT’L L. 357 (1981). 
 4. This is the standard used for the World Bank’s Doing Business reports, for which 
and with whose funding many of the indicators have been created. For details, see 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.  
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known, even this categorization is a relatively late development and 
one that has not come easy to classic economics, which treated a firm 
simply as a production function. In 1937, Ronald Coase famously 
posed the question why firms exist, i.e., why we observe not only 
arms length contractual relations among individuals, but also 
vertically integrated organizations.5 This question triggered (with 
some lag effect) a new sub-discipline: the theory of the firm.6 
Explaining who or what populates markets does not answer the 
question, what markets are and how they are constituted. To most 
economists this is not a relevant question, as markets are assumed 
and therefore don’t need to be explained. According to this view 
markets represent the state of nature. Firms, law, and other features 
are the non-market features that require explanation. It is fully 
consistent with this basic assumption to explain the emergence of 
firms as a response to market imperfections—whether rooted in 
transaction costs7 or incompleteness of contracts.8 Law and legal 
institutions feature as accidentals to these market imperfections. 
Because markets are burdened by transaction costs, firms exist; and 
since firms are replete with agency costs, law is needed to mitigate 
these costs.  
This line of reasoning has been clearly spelled out in an earlier 
paper by two of the lead authors of the Law and Finance literature, 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.9 The logic of their argument is as 
simple as it is compelling if one accepts the above premises: Firms 
need capital to grow and expand. The most important source of 
 
 5. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 6. Major contributors to the theory of the firm include Williamson, Alchian, Demsetz, 
Jensen and Meckling, and Grossman and Hart, to name just a few. For their contributions, see 
specifically OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975); Armen 
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of 
the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976); and Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart,  The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). 
 7. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 6; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost 
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979). 
 8. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 6; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of 
Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999). 
 9. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,  A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737 (1997). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/3/2010 7:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1650 
capital is external capital supplied by investors in the form of debt or 
equity. Investors will part with their money and invest in firms only if 
they can be assured that they will receive a return on their 
investment. Facing agency costs, investors will seek control over the 
firm in return for capital. This puts them into a position where they 
need to control the firm directly by acquiring a controlling stake. 
Firms that rely on external capital should therefore have highly 
concentrated ownership structures. However, when investors can 
rely on law and legal institutions to protect their interests they can 
afford to take smaller stakes. Rational investors prefer this because it 
allows them to diversify their investments across multiple firms. As 
LLS put it in their 2008 anniversary paper “legal protection of 
outside investors limits the extent of expropriation of such investors 
by corporate insiders, and thereby promotes financial 
development.”10 
The leap from a micro-level issue—the financing of firms—to the 
macro-level issue—financial market development—is asserted, but 
not explained. The missing link following the above logic must be 
that legal protections not only facilitate diversification of financial 
commitments by the existing investor base, but also and in addition, 
must encourage small investors to put their savings in equity. This 
then leads to the broadening of the investor base, which is associated 
with bigger and deeper markets. Thus, law begets markets.  
This causal nexus at the core of LLS et al.’s argument is that 
legal origin determines financial market outcomes. It does, however, 
question the key assumption in economics, which takes markets as a 
given.11 It also passes over the fact that the market is now of a very 
different kind. It is no longer limited to relatively few, big investors, 
capable of exerting control over firms if they wish to do so. The 
number of investors has multiplied and the relation between 
investors and firms has become more complex. Facing information 
problems, investors rely on intermediaries for making allocation 
decisions, and on analysts and market watchdog institutions to 
collect and monitor firm specific information.12 This results in a 
 
 10. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 285. 
 11. For a further exploration of this exogeneity paradox, see Section B below. 
 12. A substantial amount of literature seeks to explain in functional terms how all these 
different actors contribute to efficient markets. See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE 
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson 
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multiplication of agency problems that cannot possibly be addressed 
with firm level governance mechanisms, such as voting rights or 
“anti-director rights.”13 As Adam Smith argued in his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence, the increasing complexity of economic and social 
relations requires an increasingly complex set of rules and 
regulations.14 
The point has not been lost on LLS et al. The early papers Law 
and Finance and Legal Determinants of External Finance still link 
the development of stock markets directly to firm level investor 
protection. However, subsequent work focuses specifically on 
securities law.15 The choice of securities as opposed to banking law is 
interesting in and of itself and suggests a preference for financial 
markets that are closer to the idealized market that feature in the 
models of economists. Moreover, and not surprisingly, the 
conceptual framework remains unchanged. Securities law is depicted 
as an extension of individual investor protection.16 Thus, mandatory 
disclosure rules are interpreted as facilitating private enforcement, 
rather than as a means for governing complex financial markets 
whose very existence depends on the accessibility and trustworthiness 
of information.17 The specific role of regulators as lawmakers and law 
enforcers is downplayed if not ignored.18 In a companion paper, the 
emergence of financial regulators in the U.S. is explained as a 
response to weak or corrupt courts, not as a necessary change in 
 
& Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC 
in the Corporate Governance Debate (Managerial Strategic Investment Company), 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 985 (1993); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006). 
 13. This is the term LLS et al. use to refer to the shareholder rights index they created. 
See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1127.  
 14. “The more improved any society is and the greater length the severall [sic] means of 
supporting the inhabitants are carried, the greater will be the number of their laws and 
regulations necessary to maintain justice, and prevent infringements of the right of property.” 
5 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, in THE GLASGOW EDITION OF THE WORKS AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH, 16 (Ronald L. Meek et al. eds., 1982), available at 
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/196/0141-06_Bk.pdf.  
 15. Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. On the role of regulators as ‘residual’ lawmakers and law enforcers, see Katharina 
Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 J.  INT’L L. & POL. 931 (2003). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/3/2010 7:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1652 
governance called for by changes in the market place.19 Thus, the 
market in the state of nature remains the ideal type against which 
markets in the real world are benchmarked. Institutional features are 
add-ons, not constitutive of markets. Their function is to bring the 
market close to its assumed true nature. The implication is that there 
is only a single optimal (efficient) market model and a single set of 
optimal rules that can bring it about.  
The extrapolation from simple contractual models of the firm to 
complex financial markets does a disfavor to our understanding of 
markets and legal systems. If markets are rooted in legal 
arrangements, then the type of market that emerges is a product of 
political and legal choice, not an approximation of the state of 
nature. While it may still be useful to analyze what legal 
arrangements produce certain market outcomes, the choice of 
outcome variables is not a given (the “efficient market”), but 
becomes open to normative debate. Thus, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that bigger stock or credit markets are necessarily 
better—a lesson brought home by the global financial crisis. 
Assuming that micro-level institutions, in particular the quality of 
investor rights protection in firms, are perhaps not the only, but still 
important determinants for market development one would expect 
that LLS et al. run the basic test whether countries with better legal 
protection do indeed have better financial systems. However, this 
would raise problems of reverse causality. It may well be, and indeed 
has been documented,20 that law typically lags market development. 
Thus, better investor protections tend to be a response to market 
development and the crisis associated with it. The authors, therefore, 
emphasize a different finding, namely that “legal rules protecting 
investors vary systematically among legal traditions or origins.”21 The 
choice of legal origin rather than rules on investor protection 
allegedly resolves the reverse causality issue, because the legal family 
 
 19. Edward Glaeser  et al., Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J.  ECON. 853 (2001). For 
an alternative explanation on the rise of regulators in financial markets, see Pistor & Xu, supra 
note 18.  
 20. See Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country 
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2002) (documenting the development of 
corporate law in ten jurisdictions for a two hundred year period). Further analysis by the same 
authors suggests that intensive periods of legal reform coincide with periods of rapid economic 
development, at least for “origin countries,” not, however, for legal transplants. See Katharina 
Pistor et al., Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 676 (2003). 
 21. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 285 (summarizing the results of their earlier work). 
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countries belong to was for the most part determined by legal 
transplants. Legal origin can therefore be used as an instrumental 
variable for statistical purposes. In subsequent work by the same 
authors and numerous studies they inspired, the divide between 
these different legal traditions takes center stage. As LLS et al. and 
Djankov explain in their 2003 paper on the “New Comparative 
Economics,”22 after the demise of the socialist system the new 
frontier of comparative system analysis has become legal origin. 
The arguments and debates do indeed sometimes resemble the 
battle of ideologies during the cold war. In this debate the 
development of financial markets and its determinants has taken a 
back seat to legal origin. LLS and their co-authors ventured into 
studying the size of governments, formalism in court procedures, 
and barriers to entry as other applications of their legal origin theory. 
New and improved indices were developed over time and in their 
anniversary paper they finally come around to explaining that legal 
origin is not so much about specific legal rules, but rather about a 
mode of social ordering.23 Nonetheless, the basic methodological 
approach, the extrapolation from simple models rooted in bilateral 
bargains to complex systems, has remained unchanged and so has the 
endorsement of the concept of a single, efficient model of market as 
the desirable outcome variable. 
This approach not only underestimates the complexity of markets 
and their evolution, it also presents a rather crude picture of legal 
systems. Law is a complex system that cannot be reduced to the 
enforcement of property rights and contracts for the purpose of 
creating an ideal market.24 That, however, is implied by theories that 
are based exclusively on bargaining models and seek to tip the 
bargaining process in favor of the investor constituency. To be 
effective, legal systems must be perceived to be legitimate;25 i.e., they 
must be rooted in shared norms.26 Specific legal rules reflect the 
 
 22. See supra note 1. 
 23. La Porta et al., supra note 2.  
 24. An ideal market fails to materialize absent such legal prop-ups and, as the global 
financial crisis suggests, is capable of systemic failure even with such prop-ups in place.  
 25. Max Weber has stressed the importance of legitimacy in his attempts to explain 
different sources of authority, including legal authority. For details, see MAX WEBER, 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & 
Claus Wittich eds., 1968). 
 26. Whether or not a legal system reflects shared norms depends on its genesis. Legal 
systems that result from wholesale transplants are much less likely to do so than are legal 
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compromise reached at a given point in time. Because legal change is 
slow and path dependent, a legal system more accurately reflects 
accumulated past bargains than current preferences. This does not 
preclude legal change, but such change could turn out to be 
spurious. Today’s legal system of any country thus embodies a 
tension between past bargains—the preferences that have become 
institutionalized, i.e. codified in laws, precedents, and practices—and 
today’s bargains spelled out in specific legal interventions, which may 
or may not be consistent with a country’s legal legacy. This raises the 
question of how to capture the ‘nature’ of a country’s legal system as 
opposed to superficial legal rules. In most of their work, LLS et al. 
side-step the issue by using specific rules to identify systemic 
differences between legal systems, in effect using similarities of rules 
within legal families as a proxy for a legal system. The implied 
justification is that common versus civil law systems differ 
systematically in their preferences for specific rules. But that could be 
superficial. Countries belonging to the same legal family may simply 
continue to borrow from lead countries of the legal family they 
belong to without necessarily subscribing to the norms these 
borrowed rules embody.27 In fact most colonies have continued to 
borrow directly or indirectly from their colonizer’s legal system, 
simply because this is the law their lawyers were trained with (and 
often the country they were trained in) and the institutions they are 
familiar with. In their anniversary article LLS et al. now seek to 
differentiate between deep-seated preferences, or the hard-wired 
features of a legal system on one hand, and specific legal rules, or its 
software on the other. However, they hardly resolve the tension 
between the two, which would imply that legal change superimposed 
on countries that belong to a different legal family that embodies a 
different set of normative principles is probably futile. Instead, they 
attempt to identify areas of the law where they believe change in 
 
systems that evolved in a more endogenous fashion. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., The 
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003). Note that LLS et al. concede as much in 
their anniversary article. See La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 326. But this is inconsistent with 
the very assumptions on which their research project rests. 
 27. There is indeed evidence that countries often copy blindly from others in the same 
legal family. See ROBERT CHARLES MEANS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF LAW (Morris S. Arnold ed., 1980) (account of codification and re-codification processes in 
Colombia). 
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legal rules may alter economic outcomes,28 without further 
explaining why that should be the case and why they selected these 
areas of the law in particular. 
Moreover, the problem runs even deeper. It is by no means clear 
that the rules captured in the various indices LLS et al. have 
constructed reflect core features of the legal systems they are 
supposed to represent as opposed to spurious factors. Indeed, it has 
been shown that once the original data on shareholder and creditor 
rights are corrected based on more careful legal analysis, most of the 
results no longer hold.29 Yet, numerous other studies by LLS and 
others suggest that there is a systematic difference between common 
law and civil law systems. As I have argued elsewhere,30 these 
differences appear to be highly correlated with features identified by 
the socio-economic literature on comparative capitalism: This 
literature characterizes countries as ‘liberal’ or ‘coordinated’ market 
economies based on how they organize intra- and inter-firm 
relations.31 It appears that most common law countries are liberal 
market economies and most civil law countries coordinated market 
economies. This would imply both different normative preferences 
and different legal rules. Notably, many of these coordinated market 
economies have done remarkably well in the post WWII period.32 
The latest interpretation of legal origin by LLS as a “highly persistent 
system of social control”33 follows a similar trend. The authors have 
now distanced themselves from specific legal indicators and are 
instead emphasizing systemic features that result from the 
 
 28. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 325. The areas of the law they identify include 
“entry regulations, disclosure requirements, or some procedural rules in litigation.” Id.  
 29. Holger Spamann did this labor-intensive recoding effort. Holger Spamann, Law and 
Finance Revisited (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008).  
 30. Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies, 
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN 
EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE U.S. 249, 249–80 (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 2005). 
 31. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). Note that in contrast 
to the economics literature, in this approach the firm is not an anomaly of markets in need of 
explanation, but a core feature that reveals broader organizational features of markets and 
society. 
 32. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT 
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AROUND THE WORLD (2008) (showing that the propensity of common law and civil law 
countries to grow more rapidly is contingent on the time period selected). 
 33. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 326. 
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institutionalization of past practices. This conceptual move, however, 
re-opens the Pandora’s Box of causality between law and economic 
outcomes, which the authors sought to avoid by using legal origin as 
an instrument, which should not be directly related to the legal rules 
produced by it.34 
B. The Transmission Problem  
The transmission problem addresses the causal nexus between 
legal origin, the specific legal provisions found in statutes and 
regulations, and economic outcomes. In their anniversary paper, LLS 
depict the relation between origin, legal rules, and economic 
outcomes in a flow chart that leads from “Legal Origin” to “Legal 
Institutions” to economic “Outcomes.” A simplified version of the 
chart focusing only on the nexus described in LLSV (1998) looks 
like this: 
 
 
 
 
It remains unclear, however, how legal origin is linked to the 
specific rules that ultimately affect outcomes. LLS suggest that a 
country’s legal tradition is the foundation for social outcomes and 
specific rules are the transmission belt between legal origin and 
outcomes. This could be interpreted to suggest that given a 
particular legal origin only certain rules are feasible; and that 
whatever the rules are, they are unlikely to affect outcomes if they 
conflict with basic features of the legal system that are not malleable 
to change. 
The failure to explain the link between legal origin and specific 
legal institutions is particularly disconcerting when this framework is 
used for policy purposes. After all, most of the LLS et al. studies 
were sponsored by the World Bank and the World Bank has used the 
 
 34. LLS et al. gloss over this point by arguing that the transplantation of law entailed 
not only the transplantation of rules, but also of other organizational features of law and legal 
systems. That, however, differs from country to country. Moreover, persistent differences 
between law exporting and law importing countries in terms of the level of rule of law today 
over 100 years after colonialism brought about the most extensive transplantation process, 
speaks against this assertion. On this point, see La Porta et al., supra note 2, showing that legal 
origin is not an important explanatory variable for outcome variables measuring legality; 
instead the manner of law development, i.e. whether it has been receptive or unreceptive. 
       Legal Origins                  Company Law                   Stock Markets  
DO NOT DELETE 2/3/2010 7:30 PM 
1647 Rethinking the “Law and Finance” Paradigm 
 1657 
indicators for assessing countries’ legal systems and to motivate 
policy advice (Doing Business Project).35 LLS concede that if their 
theory is correct, copying laws from the common law system and 
implanting it in a civil law system is unlikely to make much of a 
difference.36 Yet, they reject the notion that this implies destiny and 
no hope for change.37 Instead they argue that some rules can be 
changed without affecting the fundamentals of a legal system and 
that these rules will nonetheless affect economic outcome. 
Specifically, they argue, “[E]ntry regulations, disclosure 
requirements, or some procedural rules in litigation can be reformed 
without disturbing the fundamental of the legal system.”38 No 
explanation is given as to why these rules and not others can be 
modified without affecting the fundamentals of a given legal system; 
moreover, no evidence is provided whether the specific rules they 
mention did in fact have the desirable impact on outcomes in real 
world cases. This, however, would be crucial before their framework 
should be used as a blueprint for regulatory reform. 
The underlying thrust of the argument appears to be that 
entrepreneurship is best left to its own devices and that the 
regulation of entry imposes unnecessary and socially harmful costs on 
business.39 Reducing these costs should be compatible with any legal 
system. This reasoning assumes away the normative priors of 
different societies. Some societies may have a preference for 
preventing harm even if this comes at substantial costs, while others 
might prefer to address damages only once they have been caused. 
Thus, from a normative perspective, entry barriers are not only 
technical rules, or rent seeking devices, but reflect different values. It 
may, of course, be the case that the means used to realize these 
 
 35. The first systematic compilation of legal indicators that were related to the ease of 
doing business in different countries was published in 2004. See WORLDBANK, DOING 
BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (2004). The database has been 
subsequently expanded and is now available online at http://rru.worldbank.org/ 
Documents/DoingBusiness/2004/DB2004-full-report.pdf. 
 36. See La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 325 (“The [legal origin] theory indeed holds 
that some aspects of the legal tradition are so hard-wired that changing them would be 
extremely costly and that reforms must be sensitive to legal traditions.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. On the fallacy of this argument, see Benito Arruñada, Pitfalls to Avoid When 
Measuring the Institutional Environment: Is Doing Business Damaging Business?, 35 J. COMP. 
ECON. 729, 730 (2007) (suggesting that this rent-seeking interpretation misses the potential 
social values of entry barriers or other aspects of formality). 
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values are ineffective, socially wasteful, or both. Yet, disregard for the 
normative aspect of law and legislation can easily lead policy makers 
astray. It is relatively simple to change the laws on the books, but, as 
is well known and by now well documented, it is much harder to 
change established practices and the normative priors that inform 
them.40 Investing resources in legislative change that can be easily 
undone by introducing counter-veiling rules or switching to informal 
practices is equally a social waste.41 
LLS also assert that these “rules can point the reformer closer to 
where the problem actually lies”;42 in other words, the legal variables 
they identify could serve as diagnostic tools for policy reform. This, 
of course, is true only if formal entry barriers, for example, are the 
root cause for large informal sectors and low entry into the formal 
sector and/or if there are no substitutes to formal entry barriers. In 
fact, it is equally possible that the standardization of rules will 
disguise rather than point to the root cause of the problems many 
countries are facing today. Specifically, if there are entrenched 
interest groups that seek to exclude new entrants, it is unlikely that a 
formal rule alone will transform the underlying power relations. If 
strong normative priors (or entrenched interests) speak against the 
liberalization of entry, other means can easily be found to restrict 
it—for example, by licensing particular types of activities or delaying 
other necessary permits (construction, zoning, etc.) that might be 
necessary for starting a business. 
Finally, in the flow chart that depicts the relation between legal 
origin, legal rules, and outcomes, there is no feedback loop from 
economic outcomes to the institutions (the specific rules) or to legal 
origin. Suppose, however, the “market friendly” intervention of 
lowering entry barriers by changing formal rules succeeds and there 
 
 40. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 26, at 179–90.  
 41. Take the following example, which Benito Arruñada cites in his paper, supra note 
39, at 732 n.9: 
[A]s a result of the reforms financed by the US development agency (USAID) and 
according to Doing Business 2007, Afghanistan has reached position 17 in the world 
for ease of setting up a business for which, according to this report, only three 
formalities are needed, taking about eight days (on-line data, 17 May 2007). 
However, Afghan entrepreneurs tell a different story. Although the actual company 
incorporation can be done fast, up to 18 months are needed to obtain the licenses 
required to start operating. The reforms have just postponed the most important 
restrictions until after the legal incorporation. 
 42. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 326. 
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is an influx of new firms into the market. In LLS’s world this would 
have an impact on economic outcomes, but would not affect the 
fundamentals of the legal system, which continues to re-produce 
rules that re-enforce legal origin. But why would one not expect that 
the influx of new entrepreneurs influence the direction of future 
legislation, which at least over time should also affect a legal system’s 
fundamentals? Thus, if the basic premise is correct—that well 
functioning markets produce socially desirable outcomes—the 
experience of these benefits, and perhaps even more importantly, the 
changing political economy that results from such changes should 
leave an imprint on legal origin. Perhaps path dependence is simply 
too strong. Yet, if those feedback loops do not operate, why would 
anyone expect any lasting effect from changing a couple of formal 
rules even in the selected areas of the law LLS et al. suggest? 
Conceding that such feedback loops might exist would open the 
possibility for a new area of research on the political economy of 
legal change, which could ultimately prove to be more fruitful for 
policy considerations than the ideological battle about legal origin.43 
C. The Exogeneity Paradox 
The legal origin theory and, even more so, the empirical results 
used to produce evidence in support of this theory are based on the 
assumption that legal origin is exogenous and that therefore we can 
isolate its effect from the effect of social systems (culture, politics, 
etc.). Yet, the legal origin theory is most powerful when applied to 
the origin countries (France, Germany, the UK, arguably the U.S.), 
not to countries to which these systems were transplanted.  
As LLS state in their anniversary paper: “Although the evidence 
on reforms is just beginning to come in and much of it is 
unfortunately confined to the developed world, many countries seem to 
be moving toward market-friendlier government interventions. If the 
world remains peaceful and orderly, the attraction of such reforms 
will only grow.”44 This statement reveals the authors’ normative 
goals: market friendliness.45 While common law is not always and 
 
 43. For a summary of micro-level studies that explore the political economy of legal and 
institutional change, see Gani Aldashev, Legal Institutions, Political Economy and Development, 
25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 257 (2009). 
 44. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 326 (emphasis added). 
 45. Id. For a critique of this normative bias, see also WORLDBANK, DOING BUSINESS: 
AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION (2008), available at   http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
DO NOT DELETE 2/3/2010 7:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1660 
under all circumstances more market friendly, it is so most of the 
time, which is why it is the preferred model. From a development 
perspective the puzzle is that market-friendly policies are not always 
producing sustainable growth. LLS insist that the relevant 
transmission channels are financial markets, but in doing so they 
must assume that financial market development produces growth 
over time. Indeed, this is precisely what the authors suggest, 
although the caveats they include are important: 
 The world economy in the last quarter century has been 
surprisingly calm, and has moved sharply toward capitalism and 
markets. In that environment, our framework suggests that the 
common law approach to social control of economic life performs 
better than the civil law approach. When markets do or can work 
well, it is better to support than to replace them. As long as the 
world economy remains free of war, major financial crises, or other 
extraordinary disturbances, the competitive pressures for market-
supporting regulation will remain strong and we are likely to see 
continued liberalization. Of course, underlying this prediction is a 
hopeful assumption that nothing like World War II of the Great 
Depression will repeat itself. If it does, countries are likely to 
embrace civil law solutions, just as they did back then.46 
 
The paper was published in June 2008, just at the time the global 
financial market crisis unfolded. Given how few observers (including 
but not limited to economists) predicted that de-regulated financial 
markets could bring the entire global financial system to the brink of 
collapse, it would be unfair to hold this against LLS et al. However, 
two points can be made. First, if both political and economic stability 
is a precondition for the success of market friendly policies as implied 
by the above quote, then this should be factored into policy advice 
given to developing countries, many of which suffer from political 
and economic instability. Indeed, it has been suggested that the 
relentless pursuit of pro-market reforms in fragile countries may have 
exacerbated latent political and ethnic conflicts and further 
destabilized them.47 Second, the statement seems oblivious to the 
 
EXTERNAL/EXTOED/EXTDOIBUS/0,,contentMDK:21679357~pagePK:64829573~piP
K:64829550~theSitePK:4663967~isCURL:Y,00.html. 
 46. La Porta et al., supra note 3, at 327. 
 47. Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law 
and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998). The argument is, of course, not novel. For an 
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series of financial crises that emerging markets have experienced over 
the past two decades, including the Mexico’s Tequila Crisis (1994), 
the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/98; the subsequent crisis in 
Russia; and Argentina’s meltdown in 2001. Long-term cross-country 
empirical evidence suggests that financial crises are highly correlated 
with preceding episodes of financial liberalization,48 i.e. the 
introduction of ‘market-friendly’ policies and their legal correlates. A 
serious consideration of the experience of emerging markets in 
response to financial liberalization in conjunction with the 
recognition that the most convincing evidence on the benefits of the 
common law comes from developed countries should give one pause 
about the policy implications of this line of research.  
The relation between crises and legal ordering noted in the 
second quote is also interesting. If crisis trigger the type of legislative 
interventions that are associated with civil law regimes, an analysis of 
crisis in recent history may be a better predictor for the nature of a 
country’s legal regime than the historical origin of its legal system. 
Indeed, it is well known that crises tend to trigger extensive 
legislative responses. Thus, the stock market crash of 1929 in the 
U.S. was followed by wave of securities and banking regulations that 
strengthened centralized regulation vis-à-vis the states and self-
regulatory organizations such as the stock exchanges.49 Moreover, 
the experience with hyperinflation in Continental European 
countries in the aftermath of World War I has been associated with 
the “great reversal” in the management of financial markets.50 
 
account of how pro-market reforms have de-stabilized social relations in England, the mother 
country of the common law, see KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). See 
also ROBERT H. BATES, PROSPERITY AND VIOLENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DEVELOPMENT (2001). 
 48. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reihnhart, The Twin Crises: The Causes of 
Banking and Balance-of-Payment Problems, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 473 (1999). In fact, some 
observers suggest that global financial crisis, which originated in the United States, is no 
exception. The only difference is that the liberalization of the subprime and derivative markets 
was, for the most part, informal rather than formal. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. 
Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Crisis so Different? An International Historical Comparison 
(Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13761, 2008). 
 49. On the history of the New Deal financial regulatory reforms, see Joel Seligman, The 
Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983) and Paul 
G. Mahoney, The Pernicious Art of Securities Regulation, U. CHI. L. REV. 1373 (1999). For a 
broader historical analysis, see Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 
Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. L. REV. Q. 849 (1997). 
 50. Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Political Economy of Corporate 
Control and Labor Rents, 114 J. POL. ECON. 145 (2006) (arguing that the great reversal, 
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Further, the experience with economic management during World 
War II has led the UK to nationalize substantial parts of its industry 
in the immediate post-war era. Thus, legal change seems to respond 
to economic and political events and sometimes to do so quite 
drastically. Indeed, according to the varieties of capitalism literature, 
both the UK and Ireland were classified as coordinated rather than 
liberal market economies for part of the post war period.51 These 
changes are difficult to explain with recourse to legal origin. While 
many of these changes have been reversed, this too cannot simply be 
attributed to legal origin, but requires the introduction of human 
agency, and indeed of political economy.52 In short, a consistent 
theory of legal development has to recognize that legal change is 
endogenous to political and economic change. That, of course, 
would challenge the notion that legal origin is exogenous and can 
therefore be used as an instrument for the purpose of econometric 
analysis—a premise that is crucial for the statistical validity of the 
work of LLS et al. 
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
The Law and Finance literature has made a major contribution in 
bringing the analysis of law and legal institutions to the forefront of 
comparative economics.53 It is not surprising that a contribution of 
this scope and scale receives both applause and critique. In this 
section of this essay I will try to develop an alternative approach to 
 
which was identified as coinciding with World War I by Rajan and Zingales is associated with 
episodes of hyperinflation); see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: 
The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003). For a 
critique of Rajan and Zingales, see La Porta et al., supra note 2, who question the accuracy of 
their data and point out that much of the market capitalization in French civil law countries 
came from government bonds. However, that should not be so troubling in light of the fact 
that even in England, corporate securities as a share of total securities traded on the London 
Stock Exchange exceeded government bonds only in the 1860s. See RANALD C. MICHIE, THE 
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY (1999).  
 51. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 31, at 8–9. 
 52. Unfortunately, they try to prove the primacy of legal origin over politics and thus 
have downplayed politics in their analysis. This was primarily in response to Mark Roe’s work, 
which stresses politics as a determinant of legal choice. See MARK ROE, POLITICAL 
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003). 
 53. Indeed, they have named this line of research the “new comparative economics.” See 
Djankov et al., supra note 1. 
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analyzing the role of law in economic systems and the processes of 
legal change in light of the critique I have developed in Part II. This 
approach builds on my joint work with Curtis Milhaupt in our recent 
book on law and capitalism.54 
The approach is based on the premise that countries differ not 
only with respect to their legal system, but also with respect to their 
economic system. In fact, we suggest that the relation can be 
depicted as a “rolling relation,” in which changes and events in the 
economy give rise to legal change (or the use of existing law), and 
vice versa.55 In contrast to LLS et al., we do not endorse a particular 
form of economic organizations—i.e. “the market”—as optimal or 
superior,56 and instead suggest that different types of capitalist 
economies have proven remarkably successful in promoting 
economic growth and development. Capitalist systems by definition 
contain a strong element of markets, but the scope of markets and 
the way in which they are governed can differ considerably. The 
most impressive growth spurts in the post World War II period, 
those of the East Asian tigers and dragons in particular, and more 
recently of China, took place in countries with legal and economic 
systems that display features of centralized organization and 
coordination.57 If different systems can be highly economically 
 
 54. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 32 (see especially the introductory chapter 
and the note on the “institutional autopsy” that precedes the case-study analysis). 
 55. Id. at 28. 
 56. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 31. 
 57. There is a voluminous literature on the growth experience of these countries. See, 
e.g., ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (2003); WORLDBANK, THE EAST ASIAN 
MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993); ADB, EMERGING ASIA, 
CHANGES AND CHALLENGES (1997); ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA 
AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989); YASHING HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS (2008); BARRY NAUGHTON, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA’S 
ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 91 (Loren Bradt 
& Thomas Rawski eds., 2008); Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in China, in SEARCH OF 
PROSPERITY: ANALYTICAL NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 227 (Dani Rodrik ed., 
2003). For specific treatment on the legal development of major economies in East and 
Southeast Asia, see KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1999). For a comparative 
sociological account that emphasizes differences in the organization of firms even within Asia, 
see GARY G. HAMILTON & NICOLE WOOLSEY BIGGART, MARKET, CULTURE, AND 
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION IN THE FAR 
EAST, IN THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM 111 (Marco Orru et al. 
eds., 1997). 
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successful it makes little sense to propagate that one is superior and 
must serve as a model for countries to grow and prosper. Instead, it 
may be more productive to try to understand under what conditions 
they can produce the desired economic outcomes. By the same 
token, each system may not only have strengths, but also weaknesses. 
We therefore posit that each system is likely to have its own inherent 
vulnerabilities, which need to be analyzed and understood in order 
to understand the trade-offs among different systems. Moreover, if—
as we suggest—legal and economic systems stand to each other in a 
rolling relationship, attempts to locate the ultimate determinants for 
observed outcomes in either law or economics (or politics for that 
matter) must be futile as this suggests that the relation among these 
various factors is highly endogenous. A more productive approach 
then is to seek to understand the iterative process of change in each 
system and to situate the contribution that law makes to change. 
Clearly, this cannot be done by large n-studies, but requires a case-
study approach.  
Case-study analysis has received a bad name especially in 
economics; they are accused of being too specific to allow for 
generalizations; and to get bogged down by too many explanatory 
variables. Some of these problems can be avoided. This is true in 
particular for the excessive variables problem. A valid theoretical 
framework helps reduce the pool of reasonable explanations for case 
studies as it does for large n-studies.58 Well-selected comparative case 
analysis (whether historical or cross-country) also helps focus the 
research.59 
Case studies have advantages that cannot be replicated in large n-
studies. They allow for context specificity as well as consideration of 
variables that may be relevant for some countries, but are irrelevant 
in other contexts. Moreover, they are less dependent on the 
availability of data for large samples; and lack of data often restricts 
the introduction of proper control, even outcome, variables. From 
the perspective of comparative law methodology case studies also 
have the distinct advantage of accounting for the fact that different 
legal systems may address the same problem in different ways. By 
simply asking whether a particular legal provision exists or does not 
 
 58. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY (1994) (describing in detail 
the “dos and don’ts” of such an analysis). 
 59. See CHARLES TILLY, BIG STRUCTURES, LARGE PROCESSES, HUGE COMPARISONS   
(1989) (describing the methodological aspects of such comparisons). 
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exist in another legal system, large n-studies commit what is widely 
regarded as a cardinal error in comparative institutional analysis: they 
assume that there is only a single solution to a problem. In fact, 
different legal systems can solve the same problem in numerous 
ways—most lawyers could even point to more than one solution 
within a single legal system. An approach that seeks to identify 
functional equivalents in different legal systems, of course, requires 
familiarity with law in different legal systems, which is why the 
sample of countries that can be concluded in such a comparative 
analysis will be bounded by the knowledge of the researchers 
conducting the study. And finally, case studies do not require the 
researcher to use a single parameter for all countries, such as 
restricting the analysis to a particular point in time—which may give 
the impression of neutrality or objectivity, but may bias the outcome 
(i.e. the year or period chosen may be an outlier, or reveal short term 
rather than long term trends). Comparability is, of course, important 
if one wishes to draw broader conclusions form a case study or 
proceed to comparative case analysis. What parameters are used 
therefore becomes a critical part of the research design. In principle, 
the same should apply to large n-studies. Thus, the choice to use 
stock market data for the year 1993 as the relevant outcome data by 
LLSV60 could be questioned. Choosing the year 1987 or 2007 
might produce quite different results. One response to this is to 
analyze longer trends, but this would also require coding legal data 
for more than one year, which requires enormous resources.61 
For the purpose of the comparative case study analysis we 
develop in Law and Capitalism we use a major firm level corporate 
governance crisis as the parameter. Thus, we select countries from a 
restricted pool of countries that experienced a major corporate 
governance crisis in recent years—but without imposing a restriction 
that the crisis had to occur in the same year or affected the same type 
of firm. Crises can be described as outliers—implying that they 
should be discarded for understanding the normal state of affairs. 
 
 60. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1. 
 61. Simon Deakin and his team have undertaken such an effort, but at least in the short 
term had to confine themselves to fewer countries in order to live up to their standards for 
comprehensive legal coding. For details, see John Armour et al., How do Legal Rules Evolve? 
Evidence from Cross Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection (Univ. 
of Cambridge Working Paper Center for Business Research No. 382, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1431008. 
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Yet, crises are more likely to reveal critical features of a complex 
system that remain undetected in the normal state. The purpose of a 
crisis analysis is not primarily to understand the cause of a specific 
corporate governance failure, but to learn about the system in which 
this failure occurred. This is akin to the approach an academic 
pathologist follows when conducting an autopsy; it is not simply to 
understand the cause of death in this patient, but to learn about the 
human body. We therefore call our case study approach an 
“institutional autopsy.” Moreover, by focusing on a crisis, we address 
one of the problems associated with case study analysis—the use of 
excessive numbers of variables. A differential diagnosis of the features 
that contributed to the crisis helps discriminate among possible 
explanatory variables and focus on those that are of primary 
relevance. An important condition for making these kinds of 
inferences is that it can be established that this crisis is not an outlier 
but representative of similar breakdown in a given country. This 
point re-enforces the point that contextualized system analysis 
requires familiarity with the system under investigation.  
We hypothesize that the nature of the crisis varies across different 
systems and is related to features of the system in which it occurred. 
We characterize legal systems along two dimensions: their 
organization and function. A legal system may be centralized or 
decentralized. The level of centralization refers to the allocation of 
power to affect legal change. Centralized systems tend to vest the 
power to affect legal change with large and well-organized interest 
groups. Decentralized systems, in contrast, vest these powers with 
individuals who can initiate legal change, for example, by bringing a 
lawsuit or challenging the decisions of a regulator. Not every lawsuit 
will trigger legal change. Thus, the extent to which an individual or 
only a well-organized group with close connections to the center of 
power can affect the future path of legal development becomes of 
critical importance. An extreme version of centralization is state 
control; and we label the Russian legal system under Putin in this 
way. Beyond this extreme case there can be intermediate cases; the 
decentralization/centralization dimension thus describes a 
continuum, not a binary state of affairs.  
The function of law also differs from system to system. A legal 
system’s primary function may be to establish individual rights and 
empowerments as a matter of substantive law and to protect these 
rights by affording them procedural remedies. Instead, a legal system 
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may vest powers with groups or organizations, or allocate rights and 
entitlements to more than one constituency. This will compel 
individuals to organize or groups to cooperate with each other 
and/or with the state. We call systems that emphasize individual 
entitlements “protective” and those that emphasize cooperation 
“coordinative.” Again, these are not discrete variables, but describe a 
continuum. There is some affinity between these two dimensions. 
Systems that are relatively centralized tend to be more coordinative; 
and systems that are more decentralized tend to be more protective. 
However, not all countries follow this pattern or do so in all areas of 
the law. Thus, the English legal system displays strong features of a 
decentralized and protective legal system; yet its takeover panel 
arrangements suggests a much greater willingness and institutional 
ability to coordinate than does the U.S. litigation based system.62 
We hypothesize that the organizational and functional features of 
legal systems make countries prone to different types of crisis and are 
also like to trigger different responses to such crisis. Thus a 
centralized system can suffer from abuse at the center; it is also 
vulnerable to defection from established interest groups whether by 
incumbents who change allegiances or by new entrants who refuse to 
play by the rules of the established system and use available legal 
devices to challenge its viability. In contrast, a decentralized system is 
vulnerable to excessive agency costs in the complex monitoring and 
governance mechanisms inherent in such a system; it also tends to be 
slow in responding to crisis precisely because it lacks centralized 
coordination mechanisms. Attempts to correct for this might be 
challenged by individuals mobilizing their rights against 
centralization efforts. 
This framework has certain affinities with the legal origin debate, 
but also departs from it in important ways. The decentralized, 
protective mode of legal system fits the idealized description of the 
common law system; and the centralized, coordinative mode reflects 
important features of the civil law system. However, whereas LLS 
depict legal origin as in immutable, hardwired feature our framework 
allows for change over time. It is also more amenable to detecting 
changes within each legal family. Thus, as indicated above, in 
 
 62. This contrast and its economic efficiency is discussed in detail by John Armour & 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar 
Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation (UCLA, Working Paper, No. 73, 2006), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928928. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/3/2010 7:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1668 
corporate law we find important differences between the UK and the 
United States. Moreover, Singapore, a country that features in our 
case analysis of the China Aviation Oil Company on the Singapore 
stock exchange, can be classified as a common law country by legal 
origin. However, our institutional autopsy reveals that the crisis 
resolution does not occur in a decentralized rights based fashion that 
is associated with the common law. Instead, it is closely coordinated 
at the center. Similarly, Germany, Japan, Russia, and South Korea—
the four ‘civilian’ systems we study—all belong to the Germanic civil 
law family. Still, the degree of centralization as well as the 
constituencies empowered to partake in the coordination of 
economic and social relations differ markedly across these countries. 
Lastly, our framework does not take law as a given, but investigates 
the role of legal change in relation to a crisis. This includes an 
analysis of the contribution law or specific legal rules may have made 
to the crisis we investigate; but also of the ways in which law is 
mobilized (and by whom) in response to the crisis. In other words, 
we are interested in law in action, not in the law on the books, 
neither in law applied to hypothetical cases, which may or may not 
be relevant to the economy in question.63 What we find in general is 
that as a result of international efforts to standardize law and 
establish best practices, the law on the books is increasingly 
converging. One of the most interesting examples in this respect is 
the codification of the Delaware takeover case law into soft law 
guidelines in Japan.64 Closer inspection, however, reveals that the 
meaning and usage of these laws differs in different countries. Thus, 
in Japan the verdict is still out whether the anti-takeover guidelines 
will facilitate the development of a more vibrant takeover market or 
rather entrench existing interest groups that mobilize poison pills 
and other takeover devices that are permissible under Delaware law 
to fend off any attempt to challenge their dominance. So far the 
evidence points in the latter direction. Similarly, in South Korea and 
Germany judges have assumed an important role as gatekeepers of 
 
 63. Note that LLS et al. employed these two strategies. For a number of indices they 
constructed, they coded the law on the books (i.e. corporate law and securities law). See La 
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 2; La Porta et al., Law and 
Finance, supra note 1; see also La Porta et al., , supra note 2. For others they used hypothetical 
cases, i.e. the number of days it takes to evict someone from an apartment or to enforce a 
bounced check as a measure of a system’s formality. See, e.g., Raphael La Porta et al., Judicial 
Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004). 
 64. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 32, at 57.  
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the established normative system and have used their legal powers to 
protect these norms even as changes in the corporate law or business 
practice seem to push towards a more market-based or common law 
system. Thus, in South Korea judges sided with the management of 
a company the foreign investors of which sought to replace it by 
declaring their attempt to mount a proxy fight against management a 
takeover attempts. And in Germany the criminal legal system was 
mobilized against the pay out of golden handshakes to management 
that had caved into a hostile takeover bid and was about to take leave 
from the company. The fact that investors and financial 
intermediaries arbitrage around existing rules to maximize their 
interests is well known. But similarly, the guardians of established 
norms (however right or wrong they may appear to an outsider) can 
switch tactics to ensure that their voices will be heard, indeed that 
changes will be stopped if they threaten the very core of the system. 
More generally, our systematic analysis of corporate crises in six 
different jurisdictions suggests that law is hardly ever the only or 
even the primary culprit of a crisis. Conversely, legal solutions are 
not necessarily the most important remedy. Much depends on who 
mobilizes law and to what ends. In short, our detailed case analyses 
shed light on the processes of legal change that are treated as black 
box in the large n empirical studies epitomized by the work by LLS 
et al. These insights highlight that actual change is contingent on 
non-legal factors and that therefore, any attempt to use the insights 
gained from the Law and Finance literature for policy purposes 
should be treated with great caution. As lawyers engaged in 
comparative legal analysis of long established “looks can be 
deceiving.”65 Moreover, once we recognize that legal systems are not 
simply the sum of the indicators that we can find in statutes or codes, 
but instead are broad systems of social ordering—as LLS concede in 
their 2008 article—the methodology for analyzing legal systems 
ought to change. To use once more a medical metaphor—the 
emphasis then shifts from large-scale epidemiological studies to the 
differential diagnosis of complex phenomena. While we may gain 
insights about the optimal treatment once we know the diagnosis of 
the underlying disease, the disease itself can hardly be identified with 
epidemiological means alone.  
 
 65. Alan L. Beller et al., Looks Can Be Deceiving—A Comparison of Initial Public 
Offering Procedures Under Japanese and U.S. Securities Laws, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 
(1992). 
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IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The purpose of this essay has been two-fold: First, to take yet 
another look at the literature spearheaded by LLS et al. and to assess 
its contribution to the broader questions of the evolution of legal 
and economic system and the proper role of policy interventions to 
alter their course. Second, it has described in a nutshell an alternative 
approach to legal and economic system analysis that uses case studies 
rather than databases with binary variables that are in turn compiled 
into indices and regressed against outcome variables. The paper 
emphasized in particular the limited insights the large n-studies can 
possibly provide for policy purposes. In conclusion it should be 
noted that this author agrees with the LLS that legal origin does 
represent a complex system of social ordering. This, of course, is not 
a new insight but one that comparative legal scholars have noted 
long ago. More importantly, however, it should trigger an 
adaptation in the methodological approach championed by LLS and 
numerous studies they have given rise to. Clearly, the benefit of data 
sets is that they create economies of scale. According to a recent 
article in The Economist on Doing Business in 2010, there are now 
405 articles in academic journals and over 1000 working papers that 
replicate in broad terms the findings by LLS.66 An open question is 
whether these statistics indicate that we are closer to an 
understanding of the interplay of economic and legal change. This 
author suggests that this may not be the case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66. Reforming Through the Tough Times, ECONOMIST 12–18, Sept. 10, 2009, at 71.  
